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THE NATURE AND NECESSITY OF
SCIENTIFIC JUDGMENT
Douglas L. Weed, M.D., Ph.D.∗
“Judgment is a utensil proper for all subjects and will
have an oar in everything.”1
INTRODUCTION
Judgment sits at the center of the intersection where science,
law, and policy meet. It is regularly invoked when scientific
evidence is used to make a claim about disease causation in the
courts2 or in regulatory risk assessment.3 Judgment also features
∗

Chief, Office of Preventive Oncology, and Director, Cancer Prevention
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University, Ph.D. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. For many
helpful comments and suggestions, the author is grateful to Dr. Joe Cecil at
the Federal Judicial Center, Dr. Graca Dores at the National Cancer Institute,
and Dr. Robert McKeown at the University of South Carolina.
1
8 MICHEL DE MONTAIGNE, Of Democritus and Heraclitus, in THE
COMPLETE WORKS OF MICHEL DE MONTAIGNE 266, 266-68 (Alfred P Knopf
ed. Donald M. Frame Trans. 2003).
2
See CARL F. CRANOR, TOXIC TORTS: SCIENCE, LAW, AND THE
POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 142 (2006). “Implicit in scientific inference is the
role of professional judgment.” Cranor notes that causal inferences made by
experts in toxic tort litigation involve judgment at several steps: reviewing,
selecting and weighing the relevant scientific data (evidence), incorporating
their background understanding of the underlying biology (and/or toxicology),
evaluating the different possible explanations (e.g. noncausal explanations) in
light of all the evidence, and finally, making a statement about the most
likely explanation for the available evidence. See also Jerome P. Kassirer &
Joe S. Cecil, Inconsistency in Evidentiary Standards for Medical Testimony:
Disorder in the Courts, 288 JAMA, 1382, 1382-87 (2002). “In the final
analysis, assessment of evidence and causal inferences (in the courts) depend
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prominently when scientific evidence is used to support the need
for a public health intervention4 or a medical treatment.5 From
on accumulating all potentially relevant evidence and making a subjective
judgment about the strength of the evidence.” See also Michael D. Green,
Michal Freedman & Leon Gordis, Reference Guide on Epidemiology in
Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 375, Federal Judicial Center (2000)
(“Drawing causal inferences after finding an association and considering these
factors (i.e. causal guidelines based on Hill’s so-called causal criteria)
requires judgment and searching analysis. . . .”).
3
See, e.g., Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, United States
Environmental Protection Agency, 2-49-51 (2005). In the first stage of the
process of regulatory risk assessment—often referred to as hazard
identification—the final summary statement is called the “weight of evidence
narrative” within which the committee summarizes its decision regarding the
carcinogenicity of a chemical in terms of one of the following descriptors:
“carcinogenic to humans,” “likely to be carcinogenic to humans,”
“suggestive evidence of carcinogenic potential,” “inadequate information to
assess carcinogenic potential,” or “not likely to be carcinogenic to humans.”
As the guidelines clearly state: “choosing a descriptor is a matter of judgment
and cannot be reduced to a formula.” (emphasis added). See also Preamble,
International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) Monograph on the
Evaluation of Carcinogenic Risks to Humans, World Health Organization
International Agency for Research on Cancer, 3 (2006) (“The evaluations of
IARC Working Groups are scientific, qualitative judgments on the evidence
for and against carcinogenicity provided by the available data.”) (emphasis
added). See also H. OTWAY, H. & D. VON WINTERFELDT, EXPERT
JUDGMENT IN RISK ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT: PROCESS, CONTEXT, AND
PITFALLS, RISK ANALYSIS 92 (1992) (“The use of formal expert judgment in
policy arenas (involving the selection and evaluation of new and alternative
technologies) is likely to increase.”) (emphasis added).
4
Causal inferences in epidemiology and other public health disciplines
have relied upon “aides” to judgment (see J.J. Schlesselman, “Proof” of
Cause and Effect in Epidemiologic Studies: Criteria for Judgment, 16
PREVENTIVE MEDICINE 195, 195-210 (1987)), often referred to as “criteria,”
that is, considerations that assist judgments about disease causation (see M.
SUSSER, CAUSAL THINKING IN THE HEALTH SCIENCES (1973); M. Susser,
Judgment and Causal Inferences: Criteria in Epidemiologic Studies, 105 AM.
J. OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 701, 701-15 (1977)), or that serve as the centerpiece of
a mixed quantitative and qualitative methodology within which judgment
plays a prominent role (see D.L. Weed & L.S. Gorelic, The Practice of
Causal Inference in Cancer Epidemiology, 5 CANCER EPIDEMIOLOGY,
BIOMARKERS & PREVENTION 303, 303-11 (1996)). As Weed and Gorelic
note, “At its core, causal inference (in epidemiology) is a complex matter of
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every corner of the complex crossroads of science and law and
policy, the judgment of scientific experts is now hailed; it is
“essential and irreducible,”6 “required,”7 a “virtue.”8
reasoned judgment . . .” Id. at 308. These so-called criteria typically include:
consistency, strength, biologic gradient (dose-response), temporality,
experimental evidence, biological plausibility, coherence, specificity, and
analogy. See Austin Bradford Hill, The Environment and Disease:
Association or Causation? 58 PROC. ROY. SOC. MED. 295, 295-300 (1965).
For a discussion of these criteria in the context of general causation, see D.L.
Weed, Causation: An Epidemiological Perspective, 12 J. L. & POL’Y 43, 4353 (2003). For a historical overview of causal inference in epidemiology and
its application to the prevention of cancer, see D.L. Weed, Causal and
Preventive Inference in CANCER PREVENTION AND CONTROL 285, 285-302
(Greenwald, Kramer & Weed, eds. 1995). Causal inferences are important
components of the process of making public health recommendations
regarding preventive interventions.
5
For therapeutic decision making, clinical judgment typically teams up
with scientific evidence. E.g., Cynthia D. Mulrow & Kathleen N. Lohr,
Proof and Policy from Medical Research Evidence, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y
& L. 249, 249-66 (2001) (“When judging the benefits and harms of health
care and predicting patient prognosis, clinicians, researchers, and others must
consider many types of evidence.”). However, Edmund D. Pellegrino points
out that there are also other components of clinical judgment: language,
rhetoric, critical thinking and logic, as well as the psychosocial, cultural, and
ethical dimensions of clinical care decision making. Edmund D. Pellegrino,
Commentary: Clinical Judgment, Scientific Data, and Ethics: Antidepressant
Therapy in Adolescents and Children, 184 J. NERV. MENT. DIS. 106, 106-08
(1996). These non-scientific components of decision-making must be
recognized and rigorously addressed: Pellegrino writes that “Any model of
clinical thinking that uses only the scientific paradigms is insufficient to
encompass all things involved in clinical judgments.” Id. at 107.
6
CRANOR, supra note 2, at 143. “The role of judgment is essential for
the individual scientist (the expert) and (for the) consensus scientific
committees (i.e. groups of experts).” He adds, “. . . there is an (almost)
irreducible scientific judgment that enters into assessing scientific evidence
and inferring that a substance causes a disease.” Id. at 152.
7
R.A. Carpenter has described the necessary role for judgment in
environmental risk assessment: “Judgment on both technical and nontechnical
issues and on their interaction is (thus) required.” R.A. Carpenter, Scientific
Information, Expert Judgment, and Political Decision Making, 18 J. OCCUP.
MED. 295 (1976).
8
“. . . [A]ll empirical investigation demands the same epistemic virtues:
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Traditionally, however, many scientists and laypersons alike
have held that, ideally, science should be free of judgment and
its subjective influences, free to discover the causal laws that
explain the world.9
Nonetheless, no one has ever found a way to circumvent the
need for judgment, perhaps because the systems studied by
biomedical sciences offer no universal laws, or because no
science can offer the proof (nor disproof) upon which
mathematics thrives,10 much less a definitive algorithm for
establishing causal relationships.11 Perhaps we cannot do without
respect for evidence, care and persistence in seeking it out, good judgment in
assessing its worth . . . .” SUSAN HAACK, DEFENDING SCIENCE WITHIN
REASON: BETWEEN SCIENTISM AND CYNICISM 167 (2003).
9
Philip Kitcher calls this “Legend,” the idea that science is free of
anything but rationality. He writes that there have been those who believe
“science is a clearing of rationality in a jungle of muddle, prejudice, and
superstition.” PHILIP KITCHER, THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE: SCIENCE
WITHOUT LEGEND, OBJECTIVITY WITHOUT ILLUSION 3-4 (1995).
10
The failure of scientific evidence to provide definitive proof (or
disproof) is called “underdetermination.” Within many circles in the
philosophy of science, it is the “most obvious” and “most troublesome”
problem for science in the area of theory appraisal, i.e. deciding which
theory gives the best explanation for the available evidence. E. McMullin,
Underdetermination, 20 J. MED. PHILOS. 233, 241 (1995). At a more
practical level, such as the testing of hypotheses about disease causation in
population-based studies, underdetermination is a constant companion of the
epidemiologist. “Typically, scientific evidence underdetermines the
hypotheses tested in (epidemiologic) research studies, providing neither proof
nor disproof.” D.L. Weed, Underdetermination and Incommensurability in
Contemporary Epidemiology, 7 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 107 (1997).
11
Most commentators agree that there is no decisive algorithm—i.e. no
methodology—for establishing causation that avoids the need for judgment.
E.g., Susser, CASUAL THINKING, supra note 4, at 140. “. . . [T]here are no
absolute rules (for causal inference). . . .” See also J. Doull, K. K. Rozman,
& M. C. Lowe, Hazard Evaluation in Risk Assessment: Whatever Happened
to Sound Scientific Judgment and Weight of Evidence? 28 DRUG METAB. REV
285, 291 (1996) (“It has long been recognized that there are relatively few
absolutes in biology, and that any interpretation of observed phenomena must
be tempered by sound scientific judgment.”) Wandall notes that the process
of accepting a (causal) hypothesis on the basis of evidence has no
accompanying algorithm nor decision rule and therefore must rely upon value
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judgment because it provides us with a way to finish off the
essential scientific puzzle:12 laying claim to the causal
relationships that connect the physical “real” world with our
perceptions of that world.13 Neither carefully crafted
observations nor the accuracy of causal hypotheses are sufficient
for this purpose. We need something else to help us decide what
those causal relationships are. We need judgment.
Expert judgment is inescapable and is as important as all that
which surrounds science, feeds it, and feeds upon it: the funding
and politics, the professional societies and journals, the
universities, corporations, and the research institutions. It is as
much a part of science as the theories, hypotheses,
methodologies, and evidence. Judgment is an integral part of the
history of science, its ethic, and its philosophy. In short, science
would not be science without judgment.

judgment, including epistemic (instrumental-goal-oriented) values. Birgitte
Wandall, Values in Science and Risk Assessment, 152 TOXICOL. LETT. 265,
267 (2004). See also Green, Freedman & Gordis, supra note 2, at 375
(“There is no formula or algorithm that can be used to assess whether a
causal inference is appropriate based on these (causal) guidelines.”) Susan
Haack expresses this idea as follows: “When something requires judgment, it
can’t be formalized into rules or some kind of decision-procedure that can be
followed mechanically.” E-mail to author from Susan Haack, July 5, 2006.
12
Thomas Kuhn links scientific problem-solving with puzzles in an
immensely influential book. THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTIONS 36-39 (3rd ed. 1996).
13
The idea that science involves the interconnections of distinct
“worlds” is attributed to the philosopher Karl Popper, whose theory of
scientific method is laced with falsifications. Interestingly enough, the
Supreme Court cited his theory in their landmark Daubert decision. Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993). See D.
Goodstein, How Science Works in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE, Federal Judicial Center 67-82 (2000); Susan Haack, Trial and
Error: The Supreme Court’s Philosophy of Science, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
S66, S66-S73 (2005). Popper proposed that the practice of science is
comprised of three different worlds: that of physical states, another of our
perceptions and observations of that physical world, and a third world of
ideas. In Popper’s third world lie theories, hypotheses, and causal
explanations. KARL POPPER, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE: AN EVOLUTIONARY
APPROACH 154-56 (rev. ed., 1981).
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That said, scientific judgment is not easy to define, although
we are fairly clear about the kind of judgment we prefer: good,
sound, and unbiased.14 We are much better, in fact, at
describing the biases that affect judgment than we are at defining
judgment itself. Overconfidence, anchoring, availability bias,
conflicts of interest, mindsets and ideologies, and “wish” bias
are commonly cited,15 any of which may shift a particular
expert’s judgment from “unbiased” to “biased.” Although this
shift does not necessarily signal an accompanying shift from

14

See SUSAN HAACK, DEFENDING SCIENCE WITHIN REASON: BETWEEN
SCIENTISM AND CYNICISM 167 (2003) for a definition of “good judgment.”
Haack has also described “shrewd judgment.” Susan Haack, An
Epistemologist Among the Epidemiologists, 15 EPIDEMIOL. 522 (2004). See
also Doull et al., supra note 11, at 291. “It has long been recognized that
there are relatively few absolutes in biology, and that any interpretation of
observed phenomena must be tempered by sound judgment.” (emphasis
added). For a discussion of the biases that can affect scientific judgment, see
infra note 15. See also OTWAY & VON WINTERFELDT, supra note 3.
15
See id. They describe a wide range of biases that can affect the
process of expert judgment: mindsets and ideologies that spring from shared
experiences and the conventional wisdom of a scientific discipline, cognitive
biases such as overconfidence, anchoring, and availability bias, motivational
biases that track closely with conflicts of interest, and mindsets and
ideologies reflecting their respective scientific communities. Overconfidence
is the tendency for experts to be more certain about probability estimates than
their knowledge can justify. Anchoring occurs when an expert holds to his
original estimate and fails to adjust it sufficiently as new or disconfirming
evidence accumulates. Availability is a cognitive bias in which there is a
tendency to base judgments on readily recalled information rather than the
full body of available information. E.L. Wynder, I.T. Higgins & R.E.
Harris, The Wish Bias, 43 J. CLIN. EPIDEMIOL. 619, 619-21 (1990) is an
interesting example of a bias that can directly affect a scientist’s claims about
disease causation: it occurs in those situations wherein the scientist has
published a study on a particular exposure-disease relationship and then
writes a review of the literature within which a causal claim is made about
that same relationship. Such a claim can be biased if the investigator is
influenced in their overall conclusion regarding causation by the direction of
the results of their own study, in either direction, positive or null. The
opportunity for “wish” bias is particularly prominent because typically those
scientists reviewing the literature have previously published studies on the
topic. See Weed, supra note 10, at 107.
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“sound” to “unsound” or from “good” to “bad,” we often
regard it as suspect, and rightly so. The fact that biases can
affect one’s judgment suggests that judgment can be improved
upon by learning to recognize and avoid the many sources of
bias.
Some argue that groups of experts, who may better
recognize individual biases, should make decisions about
causation, thereby circumventing biased conclusions.16 However,
expert groups are not in fact protected from bias; mindsets and
ideologies can be important sources of bias that arise from
within a scientific community, representing the common and
conventional wisdom of the discipline shared by its many
members.17 For example, epidemiologists may discount the need
for fully understanding the biological mechanism of a purported
causal relationship because they follow a popular disciplinary
maxim (or, rule-of-thumb) that the biological plausibility of a
causal association—and so the extent to which its mechanism can
be known—depends upon the biological knowledge of the day.18
16

Daniel Gilbert opines that it is often easier to see bias in the decisions
of others than in one’s own decisions. He writes: “Research suggests that
decision-makers don’t realize how easily and often their objectivity is
compromised . . . Much of what happens in the brain is not evident to the
brain itself.” Daniel Gilbert, I’m O.K., You’re Biased, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16,
2006, at A12. On the other hand, Gilbert also notes that we tend to
overestimate and exaggerate the effects of bias on others’ judgments.
“Research shows that while people underestimate the influence of self-interest
on their own judgments and decisions, they overestimate its influence on
others.” Id.
17
See OTWAY & VON WINTERFELDT, supra note 3, at 91, for a
discussion of mindsets and ideologies as sources of bias.
18
Weed and Hursting have examined the rules of evidence aligned with
the so-called criterion of “biological plausibility” in the practice of causal
inference in epidemiology. D.L. Weed & S.D. Hursting, Biologic Plausibility
in Causal Inference: Current Method and Practice, 147 AM. J. EPIDEMIOL.
415, 415-25 (1998). A popular and widely cited rule (of thumb) is that
biological plausibility—one of Austin Bradford Hill’s original 1965 causal
considerations—is dependent upon the knowledge of the day and therefore
cannot be required. The growth of molecular biology and, in particular,
molecular epidemiology, may change this widely accepted “mindset” in the
future. Indeed, on the other side of this coin, there are others who place an
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Such a low threshold for the mechanistic understanding of
disease causation could bias groups (and, for that matter,
individuals) toward making premature causal judgments.19
One potential solution to this problem is to select scientists
from many different disciplines to sit on panels formulating
causal conclusions, as is commonly done by regulatory agencies
and less commonly by the courts in toxic tort litigation.20
Unfortunately, another bias may be introduced if members of
one discipline discount the results of another because they
believe those results to be generally unreliable. Epidemiology,
with its emphasis on non-experimental, observational studies, is
sometimes singled out in this way, as if it were the only science
with “limits.”21
Expert judgment, although not easily defined and subject to
bias, appears to perform many different functions. It produces
(or, more precisely, is required in the production of)
decisions,23
evaluations,24
inferences,25
conclusions,22
exceedingly high threshold on evidence in support of biological plausibility;
for them, causation cannot be claimed until the mechanism involved has been
well established. Id.
19
It can also be argued that lowering the threshold for making causal
claims is a precautionary measure rather than a premature one. See D.L.
Weed, Precaution, Prevention, and Public Health Ethics, 29 J. MED. PHILOS.
313, 313-32 (2004).
20
See W.W. Schwarzer & J.S. Cecil, Management of Expert Evidence,
in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 59-63 (Federal Judicial
Center, 2000), for a discussion of the legal authority and practical
considerations, and for examples of court-appointed scientific experts.
21
Epidemiologists are sometimes their own worst enemy on this
particular issue. In a widely publicized news article in Science magazine,
entitled “Epidemiology Faces its Limits,” prominent epidemiologists (who
later claimed they were misrepresented) noted that “people don’t take us
[epidemiologists] seriously,” that “we’re pushing the edge of what can be
done with epidemiology” and that “epidemiology is stretched to its limits or
beyond.” Gary Taubes, Epidemiology Faces its Limits, 269 SCIENCE 164,
164-69 (1995). Furthermore, epidemiologists sometimes regard toxicology as
subject to bias through vulnerable extrapolations across dosage levels and
species. Cecil, personal communication, August 18, 2006.
22
Carpenter, supra note 7, at 295, notes under the heading “Expert
Judgment” that an advisory committee (is) convened to translate technical
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uncertainties,26 and last, but not least—circularly and
ambiguously enough—judgments.27 These “judgments” concern
all kinds of causes and risks: estimating the risk of cancer from
exposure to chloroform or radon in drinking water,28
characterizing exposure to benzene,29 assessing the safety of a
new bicycle crossing design,30 calculating the likelihood that

information into conclusions for public policy.
23
“It is a widely accepted claim that scientific practice contains value
judgments, i.e. decisions made on the basis of values.” Wandall, supra note
11, at 265.
24
“The evaluations of IARC Working Groups are scientific, qualitative
judgments on the evidence for and against carcinogenicity provided by the
available data.” World Health Organization, International Agency for
Research on Cancer, IARC Monographs on the Evaluation of Carcinogenic
Risks to Humans, Preamble, Lyon, 2006. See also Wandall, personal
communication, June 13, 2006. “On a very general level, I would say that a
judgment is a kind of evaluation . . . .” See also OTWAY & VON
WINTERFELDT, supra note 3, at 84 (“Judgments are inferences or evaluations
that go beyond obvious statements of fact, data, or the conventions of a
discipline.”).
25
See OTWAY & VON WINTERFELDT, supra note 3, at 84.
26
“In some cases, scientific judgment is used by a Bayesian analysis to
estimate (the) uncertainties.” D.J. Crawford-Brown & C.R. Cothern, A
Bayesian Analysis or Scientific Judgment of Uncertainties in Estimating Risk
Due to 222Rn in U.S. Public Drinking Water Supplies, 53 HEALTH PHYSICS 11
(1987).
27
MORRIS R. COHEN & ERNEST NAGEL, AN INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC
AND SCIENTIFIC METHOD 28 (1934) (“A judgment is an ambiguous term,
sometimes denoting the mental act of judging and sometimes referring to that
which is judged.”).
28
See John S. Evans, et al., Use of Probabilistic Expert Judgment in
Uncertainty Analysis of Carcinogenic Potency, 20 REG. TOX. AND
PHARMACOL., 15, 15-36 (1994) (asking experts in cancer biology/toxicology,
pharmacokinetics, and dose-response modeling to make judgments about
carcinogenic potential). See also Crawford-Brown & Cothern, supra note 26.
29
Katherine D. Walker, John S. Evans & David MacIntosh, Use of
Expert Judgment in Exposure Assessment. Part I. Characterization of
Personal Exposure to Benzene, 11 J. EXP. ANAL. ENVIRON. EPIDEMIOL. No.
4, 308-22 (2001).
30
See L. Leden, P. Garder & U. Pulkkinen, An Expert Judgment Model
Applied to Estimating the Safety Effect of a Bicycle Facility, 32 ACCIDENT
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medications cause adverse drug reactions,31 and attributing lung
cancer mortality to individual risk factors.32 The International
Agency for Research on Cancer has also employed its judgment
to assess the carcinogenic potential of a list of chemicals now
several hundred compounds long.33
We should not be surprised by the pervasiveness, utility, and
flexibility of judgment. It is, after all, a necessary component of
scientific experts’ causal claims and should therefore be useful in
all sorts of specific situations. Judgment is not unique to science
and it finds its way into many other aspects of life. As the
French philosopher, Michel de Montaigne, reminds us from
many centuries ago: “Judgment is a utensil proper for all
subjects and will have an oar in everything.”34 Value
judgments,35 moral judgments,36 and the legal decisions—the
ANAL. PREV. 589, 589-99 (2000).
31
See Yannick Arimone et al., Agreement of Expert Judgment in
Causality Assessment of Adverse Drug Reactions, 3 EUR. J. CLIN.
PHARMACOL. 61, 169-73 (2005).
32
See Elizabeth A. Casman & M. Granger Morgan, Use of Expert
Judgment to Bound Lung Cancer Risks, 39 ENVIRON. SCI. & TECH. 5911,
5911-20 (2005).
33
At present, the IARC has evaluated over 900 different chemical
compounds (and other agents, including complex mixtures such as tobacco
smoke) for carcinogenicity. See International Agency for Research on
Cancer, http://www.iarc.fr/IARCPress/index.php (last visited Oct. 11, 2006).
34
8 MICHEL DE MONTAIGNE, Of Democritus and Heraclitus, IN THE
COMPLETE WORKS OF MICHEL DE MONTAIGNE 266, 266-68 (Donald M.
Frame Trans.) (2003) New York: Alfred P Knopf.
35
“It is a widely accepted claim that scientific practice contains value
judgments.” Wandall, supra note 11, at 265. But value judgments are also
made in moral philosophy and in applied science areas such as risk
assessment and risk management. “. . .[I]n a specific situation (of risk
assessment) one must make very specific value judgments about what is
‘doing good’. . . .” Kristin Shrader-Frechette, Reductionist Approaches to
Risk, in ACCEPTABLE EVIDENCE: SCIENCE AND VALUES IN RISK
MANAGEMENT 243 (D.G. Mayo & R.D. Hollander, eds., 1991).
36
For a discussion of the relationships between causal judgments and
moral judgments (about wrongful behaviors), see J. KNOBE & B. FRASER,
CAUSAL JUDGMENT AND MORAL JUDGMENT: TWO EXPERIMENTS
(forthcoming).
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judgments—of judges are obvious and not necessarily mutually
exclusive examples.37
By recognizing the universal applicability of judgment are
we really any closer to understanding its nature? What exactly is
judgment? Is scientific judgment uniquely scientific? Or, is there
something called judgment that can be applied equally well to
science, to law, and to policy decisions? Finally, is judgment
always subjective and so devoid of any claim to objectivity? To
shed some light on answers to these questions, it will prove
helpful to turn to two very different sources: one theoretical, the
other empirical. I begin with judgment in philosophy, followed
by empirical studies of expert (scientific) judgment.
I. JUDGMENT IN PHILOSOPHY
Judgment can be found in many philosophical contexts, but
those most pertinent to this discussion are: its role in scientific
explanation, its role in medical decision making (seen through
the reflective lens of Edmund Pellegrino, physician and
philosopher), the characterization of judgment as a virtue, and
finally, the relationship of judgment to values. This section will
offer a briefly describe some of the philosophical contexts which
evoke and define the use and purpose of judgment and its
connection to different disciplines.
A. Judgment and Scientific Explanation
The aim of science is explanation, typically a causal
explanation that arises from the scientific method, or more
37

For a discussion of the biases that can affect the judiciary, see
Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Judging by Heuristic: Cognitive Illusions in
Judicial Decision Making, 86 JUDICATURE 44 (2002), who note that “the
institutional legitimacy of the judiciary depends upon the quality of the
judgments that judges make.” Jasanoff points out that in a post-Daubert
world, judges must not only make legal judgments but also scientific
judgments about the relevance and reliability of scientific evidence. Sheila
Jasanoff, Law’s Knowledge: Science for Justice in Legal Settings, 95 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH S49-S58 (2005).

WEED

3/3/2007 2:17 AM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

146

generally, from scientific inquiry.38 To be useful, judgment must
serve this aim. Haack nicely captures the link between judgment
and explanation in the context of scientific inquiry:
They (the scientists) need imagination to think up
plausible potential explanations of problematic
phenomena, to devise ways to get the evidence they
need, and to figure out potential sources of error.
They need care, skill, and persistence, and
intellectual honesty, the moral fibre to resist the
temptation to stay out of the way of evidence that
might undermine their conjectures; and good
judgment in assessing the weight of the evidence,
unclouded by wishes or fears or hopes of getting
tenure or resolving a case quickly or pleasing a
patron or mentor or becoming rich and famous.39
At first glance, judgment appears to be a distinct mental
facility utilized near the end of the inquiry, from which the best
scientific explanation of a phenomenon emerges. Science has no
monopoly on this approach to inquiry and to the arrangement
between judgment and explanation. Anyone who considers
herself an “empirical inquirer,” including journalists and
historians as well as scientists of all stripes, has a similar
strategy. A general model of empirical inquiry involves
informed conjectures, contrasts of conjecture with the relevant
evidence, and the application of judgment to help decide whether
any given conjecture should be kept as the best explanation, or

38

The general aim of biomedical science is explanation in terms of
causal relationships. Indeed, Lipton argues that all scientific explanations are
causal explanations: “To explain a phenomenon is to give an account of its
causal history.” PETER LIPTON, INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION 30
(2nd ed., 2004). Karl Popper notes that “. . . it is the aim of science to find
satisfactory explanations or whatever strikes us as being in need of
explanation.” He also aligns scientific explanation with causal explanation.
KARL POPPER, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE: AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH 191
(rev. ed., 1981).
39
See SUSAN HAACK, DEFENDING SCIENCE WITHIN REASON: BETWEEN
SCIENTISM AND CYNICISM 97 (2003) (emphasis added).
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whether it should be dropped or modified.40 Nevertheless, the
scientific inquiry associated with disease causation (as carried
out in the biomedical sciences) conforms well to this model, a
model rich in conjectures, evidence, explanations, and the
various forms of reasoning that can connect these together:
inductive, deductive, retroductive, hypothetico-deductive,
Bayesian, and “inference to the best explanation,” to name a
few.41
Scientific reasoning is also not enough to accomplish the
work of science. Ethical reasoning (whether in the form of
principles, rules, or the maxims of case-based ‘casuistic’
thinking) is also important, especially in studies involving human
subjects, where requirements for informed consent,
confidentiality, and avoiding harm determine how and even
whether studies can be carried out.42 All science lives in the
shadow of scientific misconduct and its menacing instigator, the
“fame and fortune viper,” whose fangs can be avoided by
promoting professional virtues (Haack’s “moral fibre”) and by
recognizing that values can influence the practice of science in
powerful ways (Haack’s fears, hopes, and wishful thinking).43

40

Id.
Scientific reasoning is as much about the past as the present and
future; within it can be found the background knowledge and experience that
a scientist brings to the process of inquiry as well as the methods of research
synthesis that summarize and aid in the interpretation of scientific evidence.
42
For general treatments of the role of ethics in biomedical research—
i.e. bioethics—see the classic text on the principles of biomedical ethics,
BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS (4th ed.,
1994). See also the interesting and somewhat controversial discussion of casebased ethical reasoning—casuistry—in JONSEN & TOULMIN, THE ABUSE OF
CASUISTRY: A HISTORY OF MORAL REASONING (1988). For a general
discussion of the application of bioethics to a specific health science
discipline, namely epidemiology, see COUGHLIN & BEAUCHAMP, ETHICS AND
EPIDEMIOLOGY (1996).
43
There is no quick fix for preventing scientific misconduct. D.L.
Weed, Preventing Scientific Misconduct, 88 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, 125, 12529 (1998). It can be a huge burden on the prestige and public perception of
any science, although it has a particularly devastating effect on biomedical
science, where individual patients’ lives and, more generally, the public’s
41
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What is not yet clear, however, is the extent to which
judgment plays a role in all these components of scientific
inquiry or, alternatively, whether it can be separated out, to be
brought into the process near the end. On the one hand, it seems
reasonable for judgment to be involved in formulating
hypotheses and analyzing data from the start, long before a
decision regarding causation is attempted.44 For is it not the case
that a new hypothesis might emerge from a careful
consideration—a judgment—of the lack of evidence?45 There are
also the value judgments and moral judgments that affect the
practice of science all along its journey from one explanation or
paradigm to another.46 On the other hand, it is also reasonable
to place judgment near the end of a causal inquiry as a separate
and distinct facility applied to the heavily metaphorical notion of
the “weight of evidence.”47 For is it not also the case that once
reasoning has been applied to the available evidence, values
identified and biases avoided, the expert then puts it all together
health lies in the balance. See Jerome P. Kassirer, The Frustrations of
Scientific Misconduct, 328 New Eng. J. Med., 1634, 1634-36 (1993).
44
See supra note 1 for a further discussion.
45
The philosopher Michael Polanyi is probably best known for his
comprehensive look at the influential role of the individual scientist in the
process of science. “. . . [I]nto every act of knowing there enters a tacit and
passionate contribution of the person knowing what is known. This personal
coefficient is no mere imperfection but a necessary component of all
knowledge.” MICHAEL POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE: TOWARDS A POSTCRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 312 (1958). See also Karori Mbugua, Michael Polanyi
and the Personal Element in Science, 17 SOUTH AFR. J. PHIL. 152, 152-60
(1998).
46
See Wandall, supra note 11, at 265.
47
“Weight of evidence” is almost as popular a concept in the biomedical
science literature as “judgment.” Indeed, they often appear together,
especially in the areas of causal inference and risk assessment. “Weight of
evidence” is a particularly vague concept that typically appears in solely a
metaphorical sense, without pointing to any specific methodology of
interpreting evidence, much less a qualitative or quantitative weighting
scheme. Douglas L. Weed, Weight of Evidence: A Review of Concept and
Methods, 25 RISK ANALYSIS 1545, 1545-57 (2005); Sheldon Krimsky, The
Weight of Scientific Evidence in Policy and Law, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH,
S129-36 (2005).
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and makes her final judgment? The exact nature of judgment,
then, remains elusive.
B. Judgment in Science-Based Clinical Medical Decisions
Pellegrino, the physician-philosopher, appreciates the
complex nature of judgment as it is used in the practice of
evidence-based medicine. A clinical judgment, in his view, is
the decision regarding the best course of action for a patient, a
decision that combines science with ethical norms, the virtues
and the values of physician and patient alike.48
Virtues are particularly important and Pellegrino promotes
both the intellectual virtues of excellence, objectivity, and
practical wisdom with the moral virtues of benevolence,
honesty, and self-effacement. He puts great stock in prudence,
the “capstone” virtue, linking the intellectual, truth-bearing,
virtues with the moral, good-seeking, virtues. Prudence connects
medical science with medical practice and serves both the
explanatory aim of science and the beneficent aim of medicine.
Virtue, then, supports the professional practice of evidencebased medicine along with the familiar bioethical principles—
non-malfeasance, beneficence, respect for persons, and justice—
and all that science itself has to offer each clinical judgment.49
C. Judgment as Practical Wisdom
Judgment can be narrowly aligned with a specific virtue, one
of the many character traits that assist us in doing our work—in
this case, our scientific work—well. Some see judgment as
practical wisdom, an Aristotelian virtue.50 Good judgment, in
48

See Pellegrino, supra note 5, at 106-08.
See EDMUND PELLEGRINO & DAVID THOMASMA, THE VIRTUES IN
MEDICAL PRACTICE (Oxford University Press 1993).
50
“. . . [J]udgment (is) essentially the faculty Aristotle described as
practical wisdom, which reveals itself over time in individual decision rather
than in the enunciation of general principles.” THOMAS NAGEL, The
Fragmentation of Value, in PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS 50 (T. Beauchamp, ed.,
McGraw-Hill 1982).
49
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this view, reveals itself in individual decisions in the same way
that any virtue—excellence, objectivity, honesty, or prudence—
reveals itself in the actions and decisions of those in possession
of a good, virtuous, character. Scientific judgment, then, can be
considered an epistemic virtue, serving the explanatory aim of
science.51
A virtue, it should be noted, is more an attribute of character
than an attribute of action. Put another way, a virtue is a
disposition rather than a skill or a technique. It disposes us—
motivates us—to do our work well.52 As the virtue of practical
wisdom, therefore, judgment is an inherent tendency that
motivates us to make a good decision about causation given the
available evidence. It does not act independently of the other
components of such a decision, including other virtues, but in
concert with them.
D. Judgment and Values
Up to this point, my characterization of judgment has run
along two parallel yet shared tracks. Judgment can be a virtue,
plain and not-so-simple, but it can also be considered a
multidimensional mental capacity—a process—within which
reasoning, virtues, and values operate on scientific evidence.
Before sorting out this overlap, and to complete this brief
philosophical snapshot of the nature of judgment, I turn to the
role of values in scientific inquiry.
Values and value judgments in science emerged from the
postmodern, largely historical, view of scientific progress in the
51

SUSAN HAACK, DEFENDING SCIENCE WITH REASON: BETWEEN
SCIENTISM AND CYNICISM 167 (Prometheus Books 2003).
52
See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (2d ed. 1984) for a
general account of virtues in ethical theory. See Pellegrino and Thomasma,
supra note 5, for the role of virtues in medical practice. In general, “virtues
are to be distinguished from skills and techniques. They are dispositions or
tendencies and are valued differently. Errors in technique are expected (i.e.
the honest mistake); greater reservations arise when judgments suggest a lack
of personal integrity.” Douglas Weed and Robert McKeown, Epidemiology
and Virtue Ethics, 27 INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 344 (1998).
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mid-twentieth century,53 with intellectual roots deep in American
pragmatism.54 They come in two basic varieties: epistemic (or
constitutive) values with origins in an objective tradition, and
another, sometimes called contextual values, with origins in a
subjective or humanistic tradition.55 The constitutive values are
those criteria, for example, that characterize a good scientific
theory. These assist scientists in selecting one theory or
hypothesis over another. Thomas Kuhn’s list of epistemic values
includes: accuracy, consistency, scope, fruitfulness, and
simplicity.56 From Popper’s philosophy we could add
predictability, testability (or refutability), and explanatory
power.57
The epidemiologists, interestingly, have their own list of
discipline-specific constitutive values—so-called causal “criteria”
that assist them in distinguishing causal relationships from

53

THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
(University of Chicago Press 3d ed. 1996) (1962), is generally regarded as
the most important contemporary source of the notion that values play a
critical role in scientific progress.
54
Two giants in American pragmatism were Charles Peirce and John
Dewey. Judgment featured prominently in their respective works. “A
judgment is the mental act by which the judger seeks to impress upon himself
the truth of a proposition.” CHARLES S. PEIRCE, PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS
OF PEIRCE 103 (Justus Buchler, ed., Dover Publications 1955). “Philosophy
is inherently criticism . . . .a criticism of criticisms. Criticism is
discriminating judgment . . .” INTELLIGENCE IN THE MODERN WORLD: JOHN
DEWEY’S PHILOSOPHY 260 (Joseph Ratner, ed., Random House, Inc. 1939).
55
See HELEN LONGINO, SCIENCE AS SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE: VALUES AND
OBJECTIVITY IN SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY (Princeton University Press 1990).
56
See THOMAS KUHN, Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice,
in THE ESSENTIAL TENSION: SELECTED STUDIES IN SCIENTIFIC TRADITION
AND CHANGE 321 (1979).
57
Popper’s philosophy is often described in terms of his signature
concepts of refutability (the methodological equivalent of falsifiability) and
testability. He also emphasized how increasing the falsifiability of a
hypothesis in turn increases its explanatory power. “A theory is the bolder
the greater its content. It is also the riskier: it is the more probable to state
that it will be false.” POPPER, 53 THE TWO FACES OF COMMON SENSE 32105 in OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE (rev. ed. Clarion Press, 1981).
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statistical associations.58 These include: consistency, strength,
gradient
(dose-response),
experimentation,
plausibility,
coherence, temporality, specificity, and analogy.59 Investigators
using these criteria (or guidelines) in an assessment of evidence
have many choices to make: which evidence to select, how to
prioritize them, and what rule of inference they will assign to
each so-called “criterion” to signify what it will take for the
available evidence to satisfy that particular criterion.60
For example, in cancer epidemiology, investigators typically
emphasize consistency (the extent to which published, peerreviewed, studies have similar results), strength (the quantitative
magnitude of the observed relationship between exposure and
disease outcome as measured in a study population), and
biologic plausibility (the extent to which the biological
mechanism is known).61 These, in turn, reflect general scientific
principles (or maxims) that play an important role in scientific
reasoning.62 Consistency of findings in the face of repeated (and
58

Causal inference has been discussed in epidemiology for decades and
is most often described in terms of “criteria” which are also called
“considerations” or “guidelines.”
59
The British medical statistician, Austin Bradford Hill, published a
now-classic article setting forth nine causal considerations (now most often
called “criteria”). Austin Bradford Hill, The Environment and Disease:
Association or Causation? 58 PROC. ROY. SOC. MED. 295 (1965).
60
For a discussion of the value-laden nature of Hill’s criteria, see Weed,
supra note 9.
61
The use of causal criteria in epidemiology typically occurs in
published reviews of the scientific literature, textbook chapters, and editorials
commenting upon the causal significance of a particularly important (new)
study. In a systematic review of a series of these published reviews in cancer
epidemiology, several patterns of usage were revealed: the most common
criteria used in practice were: consistency, strength, and biologic plausibility.
Other criteria were also employed, depending upon the particular approach of
the investigators. See Weed & Gorelic, supra note 4.
62
The causal criteria of epidemiology used by many public health and
medical disciplines were developed in the mid-20th Century without much
explicit attention to their theoretical roots. More recently, these criteria have
been linked to more general scientific principles, including testability and
predictability. See CAUSAL INFERENCE 15-32 (Kenneth J. Rothman, ed.,
1988); Douglas Weed, Methods in Epidemiology and Public Health: Does
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more stringent) tests reflects the principle of testability. Strong
associations typically mean that alternative explanations—
confounders—are less likely. And the existence of a wellevidenced biological mechanism may permit better predictions of
future effects.
Aligning constitutive (scientific) values with general
scientific precepts and principles such as quantitation, testability,
and predictability, suggests that it is incorrect to necessarily
align values with subjectivity. Since “epistemic” values play
such an important—indeed, key—role in scientific reasoning, it
follows that scientific judgment, inasmuch as it is part reasoning
and part values, has some claim to objectivity. In other words,
calling expert judgment “subjective,” without qualification, is
misleading at best, inappropriate at worst.63
Contextual or subjective values also play an important role in
scientific inquiry. These arise from many sources: psychology,
social and cultural forces, politics, and ethics. They affect many
parts of the scientific endeavor, including but not limited to the
choice of research topic as well as the interpretation of
evidence.64 An interesting example can be found in
epidemiological literature, in which an academic scientist (with
strong but undisclosed anti-abortion views) published a review of
the scientific evidence on the topic of the potential relationship
between induced abortion and breast cancer, concluding that the
causal association was responsible for thousands of breast cancer
deaths each year and characterizing it as a public health
tragedy.65 This scientist later admitted in a published newspaper
Practice Match Theory?, 55 J. OF EPIDEMIOLOGY AND COMMUNITY HEALTH
104-10 (2001).
63
See Y. Arimone, B. Begaud, G. Miremont-Salame, A. FourrierReglat, M. Molimard, N. Moore & F. Haramburu, A New Method for
Assessing Drug Causation Provided Agreement with Experts’ Judgment, 59 J.
OF CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 308-14 (2006).
64
See Wandall, supra note 11, at 267.
65
J. Brind, V.M. Chinchilli & W.B. Severs, et. al., Induced Abortion
as an Independent Risk Factor for Breast Cancer: A Comprehensive Review
and Meta-Analysis, 50 J. OF EPIDEMIOLOGY AND COMMUNITY HEALTH 48196 (1996).
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interview that his conclusions had been colored by his moral
values.66 It should be noted that other epidemiologists,
examining the same evidence at the same time and using the
same criteria of causation, concluded that not only was there no
causal association, but more significantly, that there was no
evidence of even a statistical association between induced
abortion and breast cancer.67
Values are vital and powerful players in scientific inquiry,
with influence at both theoretical and practical levels. Some say
that in the actual practice of making an expert (scientific)
judgment of the available (weight of the) evidence, these
objective and subjective value-laden traditions cannot be
separated.68 In the end, an expert’s judgment is always at least
one part fact and two parts value.
E. Four Types of Judgment
Perhaps not surprisingly, this brief philosophical overview
has both complicated matters and provided insights into the
nature of judgment. A relatively simple model—that sound and
unbiased judgment, applied to the scientific evidence, results in
a causal assessment or claim—is probably insufficient. Either
way it is vague, because it does not explicitly recognize that
judgment can include scientific and ethical reasoning as well as
values and virtues, or it is too narrow, because it assigns
judgment to one of the virtues and ignores the role of reasoning,
other virtues, and values in evidentiary judgments.
Several different senses of the concept of judgment have
been identified. It can be an outcome, as in the final causal
judgment (or decision or claim) made by an individual scientist
or group of scientists. Similarly, a physician’s decision to
intervene on behalf of her patient is a clinical judgment. But
judgment can also be the multidimensional mental capacity that
66

R.A. Knox, Bias in Abortion Study is Charged, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct.
12, 1996, at A1.
67
See Weed, supra note 10, at 111.
68
See OTWAY & VON WINTERFELDT, supra note 3, at 84.

WEED

3/3/2007 2:17 AM

NATURE & NECESSITY OF SCIENTIFIC JUDGMENT 155
incorporates forms of reasoning, various values, and several
virtues, and with which one produces an outcome—a judgment—
when confronted with evidence. Thirdly, judgment can be more
narrowly framed as just one of the dimensions of this broader
capacity: given the evidence, the scientist reasons, considers
(when she can) the values that may guide or influence her
conclusion, and then employs her judgment—that reflects her
character—along the way. This third sense of judgment tracks
most closely with the virtue of practical wisdom.
There may also be room for one more type of judgment,
which is X: as an irreducible, if not independent, component of
the process not captured by reasoning, values nor virtues, and
yet without which the final product—a decision regarding the
existence (or not) of a well-evidenced causal explanation—cannot
be completed. Perhaps this is just intuition or perhaps it is just
common sense, although we should never forget Thoreau’s
warning about this particularly ill-defined human capacity: “The
commonest sense,” he wrote, “is the sense of men asleep, which
they express by snoring.”69
Separating out this irreducible and rather vague—“whatever
remains”—version of judgment may be difficult. It may also be
difficult to separate out any of the components of judgment in
practice inasmuch as each intimately influences the other and
likely operates simultaneously with all others. Practical wisdom,
for example, helps us to reason well. Similarly, judgment (as the
virtue of practical wisdom) is not only applied at or near the end
of the process, but also during the initial phases of scientific
inquiry when selecting which hypothesis to study, a decision that
is also affected by scientific reasoning (which puzzles remain to
be solved) and social values (which studies funding agencies will
support given their respective research priorities). Practical
wisdom will also come in handy, along with scientific reasoning,
and the virtues of excellence, and objectivity, when deciding
(i.e. judging) which studies are relevant, their validity, and their
relative weights in an interpretative assessment of causation or
risk. Finally, judgment—as a multidimensional capacity to make
69

H.D. THOREAU, WALDEN 287 (Alfred P. Knopf 1992).
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a reliable decision in the face of evidence—aids in selecting
which causal criteria (or other epistemic values) to employ or,
alternatively, how to prioritize them, given the available
evidence, a very good example of a type of a judgment that is
part fact, part value; part objective, part subjective; part
quantitative, part qualitative.
We can conclude that a scientist’s judgment is applied to the
evidence, both after and in parallel with the complex firing of all
the neurons and mental pathways needed to reason scientifically,
think ethically, and act in accordance with one’s character (i.e.,
with the virtues) and values, whether those values come from
within or from outside the scientific community. Given all these
factors, it is a complex mix indeed that characterizes an expert’s
scientific judgment.
II. EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF EXPERT JUDGMENT
Those who study expert judgment, recognizing the difficulty
of pinning down a precise definition and appreciating its
complex multidimensionality, have primarily examined the
extent to which a carefully selected and small group of experts,
when shown exactly the same information (i.e., the scientific
evidence) and having been interviewed (and coached) by trained
elicitators,70 can arrive at similar conclusions.71 These studies do
70

“Elicitators” are those trained in the study methodologies of eliciting
(guiding) judgments. Facilitators would be a reasonable synonym.
71
A systematic review of the state of the science of studying expert
judgment is beyond the scope of this paper. Walker et al. include a brief
history of this topic in their introduction to a study that elicited what they call
“subjective judgment” regarding personal exposure to benzene in the absence
of adequate amounts of relevant data. Katherine Walker et al., supra note 29,
at 308-22. Note that the outcome of interest in this study is the extent to
which a group of seven scientific experts can agree on the concentration of
benzene individuals in a target population (being study separately) were
exposed to at home, indoors, and in their ambient environment. These
experts “exhibited striking differences in the degree of uncertainty expressed”
despite being reasonably close in agreement about the mean (average)
benzene exposure concentrations. Id. at 308. In another study by Evans et
al., the investigators elicited statements regarding causality (carcinogenicity)
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not examine the independent role of judgment so much as the
end result of a process that involves the scientific evidence,
whatever reasoning process and values and biases each
individual expert brings to the table, and the interventions of the
investigators, all of which may have some impact on whatever
final judgments are made. In some studies, the experts’
individual judgments agree enough to be aggregated. In other
studies, there are irresolvable differences. Both outcomes reflect
what has been observed in another type of study—more
descriptive—examining how experts in the everyday practice of
causal inference have judged causation, given epidemiologic and
toxicological evidence. In the practice of public health, for
example, some reviewers of a body of epidemiologic and
toxicologic evidence may claim causation, while others will not.
Similarly, experts invited by the courts to examine scientific
evidence can come to vastly different conclusions regarding
general causation.
In Soldo v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals,72 for example, differing
claims of causation regarding a medication’s capacity to cause
stroke were partially explained by the fact that different
scientific disciplines were involved. A neurologist and an
epidemiologist were unconvinced about general causation; the
pharmacologist, on the other hand, disagreed and made the
causal claim.73
of chloroform in drinking water, given the available evidence, plus a formal
(protocol-driven) elicitation process. In the words of the study authors, “risk
distributions varied considerably between experts,” ranging from no risk to
risks considered to be of regulatory significance. John Evans et al., Use of
Probabilistic Expert Judgment in Uncertainty Analysis of Carcinogenic
Potency, 20 REG. TOX. AND PHARMACOL 15, 15-36 (1994). In an elicitation
study of the judgment of five lung cancer experts, on the other hand, all five
agreed that cigarette smoking, residential radon, and environmental tobacco
smoke were the major causes of lung cancer and that between 80 and 95
percent of lung cancer deaths were due to cigarette smoking. Casman &
Morgan, supra note 32, at 5914.
72
Soldo v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp., 244 F. Supp. 2d 434 (W.D.
Pa., 2003).
73
See Joe Cecil, Ten Years of Judicial Gatekeeping Under Daubert, 95
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S74, S76-S78 (2005).
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We can conclude, then, that in both concocted and real
world scenarios, when experts are faced with exactly the same
evidence, they may or may not disagree on its causal
interpretation.
A. Disagreements about Causality
Disagreement may not always be a problem for science
because it can pave the way for scientific progress.74 Reasonable
error-seeking resolution of scientific disagreements can stimulate
progress at the “micro” level (when disagreements with the
conclusions of a study give rise to a belief that a different,
presumably better, study is warranted), and at the “meta” level
(when disagreement with an assessment of the causal
significance of a body of evidence gives rise to a belief that a
new research program is needed to reveal the underlying
mechanism). At the “macro” (paradigmatic) level, however,
where the proponents of a new—even, revolutionary—theory do
battle with those protecting the status quo, more research may
not be the key to resolution. Paradigmatic shifts are more like
religious conversions than rational exercises.75 Nevertheless, at
the micro and meta levels, the resolution of the disagreement
involves the familiar refrain, “more research is needed.”
Scientific disagreement that is reasonable, in other words, can
be resolved—or, more precisely, potentially resolved—with
better studies, including improvements in the methods for
interpreting those studies, the so-called methods of research
synthesis.76
74

Haack, personal communication, July 5, 2006. The term
“disagreement” as used here means the reasonable kind, where both sides of
an issue employ “sound” judgment (not yet well-characterized) yet still
cannot agree on the interpretation of the available evidence. The term
“progress” means the replacement of one scientific problem-solution with
another, typically achieved with more research designed to eliminate errors in
earlier studies. See POPPER, supra note 13.
75
See KUHN, supra note 12.
76
See D. Weed, Evidence Synthesis and General Causation: Key
Methods and an Assessment of Reliability, 54 Drake L. Rev. 639, 639-50
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More research, of course, does not necessarily lead to less
controversy. If new studies firm up the evidence on both sides
of a disagreement, the controversy continues. Indeed, this
phenomenon has been frequently observed for decades-long runs
of epidemiologic studies, and it has been cited by the media (and
occasionally by scientists) as strong evidence of a certain
weakness of this inherently observational yet essential
biomedical science.77
B. Does More Research Mean Less Judgment?
It is commonly said that in the absence of sufficient scientific
evidence, we must rely on the scientist’s (subjective) judgment.78
But does it follow that as more evidence accumulates, there is
less judgment employed? The answer to this question depends on
the type of judgment under consideration.
Recall the four senses of judgment described earlier,79 to
which subscripts have been added for ease of presentation:
judgment0, an outcome and the final result of judgment1;
judgment1, the multidimensional mental capacity within which
scientific and ethical reasoning operate along with the virtues
and values; judgment2, the virtue of practical wisdom (and so a
component of judgment1); and judgment3, a sense of the concept
not captured by the others; intuitive, almost mystical, and
commonly applied to the evidence at the end of the overall
process of inquiry.
As more evidence accumulates, the complexity of the final
assessment regarding causation can only increase, requiring
more judgment1 (and so, judgment2). Put another way, both these
forms of judgment are needed at all steps along the journey
undertaken in a systematic assessment of the available evidence

(2006).
77
See supra note 21 for a further discussion.
78
For a recent example, see Walker et al., supra note 29, at 308.
“Frequently, however, data are neither abundant nor directly relevant,
making it necessary to rely to varying degrees on subjective judgment.” Id.
79
For a further discussion see supra Section E.
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and so must increase along with the increase in the amount,
kinds, and varying characteristics of the accumulating evidence,
regardless of the results of that evidence. Only judgment3 could
possibly shrink away as the evidence accumulates inasmuch as it
is compatible with a rather naïve view of the relationship
between evidence and judgment wherein a causal conclusion
can, with enough strong and unequivocal evidence, be
determined by that evidence, without the need for any
“judgment” at all, as if to say that the evidence “proved” the
hypothesis. Yet despite the popularity of the concept of “proof”
among scientists, especially at conferences where randomized
clinical trial results are presented, it is widely accepted that
science has no such claim on determinism and that evidence
always underdetermines the hypotheses being tested.80 We can
presume, therefore, that the mystical, intuitive sense of judgment
(judgment3) like its cousins, judgment1 and judgment2, will
always be required in any causal interpretation of evidence.
Perhaps it will fade as evidence accumulates, although there is
no way to measure it.
C. Disagreements about Causality in the Courts and in the
Regulatory Environment
Disagreement about causation may be good for science, but
it is a serious concern in the courts, due to the adversarial nature
of the legal process, with (ideally) equally “expert” experts
representing defendants’ and plaintiffs’ claims about the
reliability and relevance of the scientific evidence as well as
causal interpretation. Precisely the same situation exists within
the regulatory context, where typically there are also two
contrary views: one favoring looser standards and the other
favoring stricter standards on some potentially hazardous
material.
There is no easy solution to this problem. There is no a
priori reason why we should necessarily expect any two experts
80

See E. McMullin, Underdetermination, 20 J. MED. PHILOS. 233,
233-52 (1995). See also, supra note 8.
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to agree on the overall causal interpretation—having used their
judgment—of the available evidence. The sheer complexity of
causal assessments is one concern, reflected in the many
theoretical, methodological, and practical choices available to
causal decision makers. Another concern is the influence of
virtues and values. Finally, we cannot forget the very real effect
of various perspectives on causation that corresponds to
membership in different scientific disciplines.
The problem of disagreement is such a great concern for
judges (especially, but not exclusively, in toxic tort litigation)
and for policymakers (including public health and medical
professionals) because they are charged with, and are therefore
responsible for, decisions about what should be done “today”—
that is, without the luxury of waiting for additional scientific
evidence. Something must be decided, at this Daubert hearing or
at this clinic visit, at this regulatory hearing, or in the face of
this outbreak of disease in this community.81 When faced with
scientific disagreement, the fact finders in court or decision
makers in other contexts must either interject their own version
of the scientific state of affairs—like a tie-breaker—or they must
find a way to determine that one or the other side of the
disagreement is incorrect, or more likely so. In any case, this
situation must involve an assessment of the soundness of
others’—the experts’—judgment.
III. SOUND JUDGMENT
If there were rules (or algorithms) for causal decisions, then
an answer to the question, “What is sound judgment?” would be
straightforward and involve following the rules. Unfortunately,
no such algorithm exists and, to make matters more difficult, it
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A central message of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
516 U.S. 869 (1993) was the Supreme Court’s designation of the trial judge
as the “evidentiary gatekeeper,” responsible for screening expert testimony to
determine whether the relevancy and reliability requirements for scientific
evidence are met. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DISCUSSION OF THE
COMMITTEE ON DAUBERT STANDARDS: SUMMARY OF MEETINGS (National
Academies Press 2006).

WEED

3/3/2007 2:17 AM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

162

can be inferred from our earlier discussion that judgment
(whether judgment1 or judgment2 or both) is important even in
those situations in which algorithms (say, for statistical analysis)
produce quantitative results; conclusions about causality do not
leap out from the numbers, judgment is always required.
So what constitutes “sound” judgment and can we
distinguish it from “good” judgment and from “unbiased”
judgment? As noted earlier, we generally prefer good, sound,
and unbiased judgment in matters scientific.
To say that someone has “good” judgment suggests that in
both the short and long run, their decisions have proven to be
well-regarded or, more often “right” than not, or some other
such evaluative assessment that focuses on the outcome more so
than the process through which the decision or outcome was
produced.82 “Sound” judgment, in contrast, suggests that the
process itself—the mental process that produced the outcome—
was exemplary in some way. “Good” judgment, therefore,
primarily refers to judgment0, whereas “sound” judgment refers
to judgment1.
But it would probably be a mistake to suggest that
“goodness” and “soundness” are not overlapping in meaning
and importance. In these matters, outcome and process always
go hand-in-hand. And so it seems reasonable to suggest that
good outcomes could conceivably come from unsound judgment
(perhaps because the process is infected with unsound reasoning,
e.g., frank errors in scientific reasoning) and vice versa: that
sound judgment could, in some instances, produce bad
outcomes, given the complexity and unpredictability of real-life
matters.
How bias relates to the soundness and goodness of judgment
is also important. An unbiased judgment is not necessarily
sound; there are many other components, such as scientific
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Section III is limited to judgment as outcome (judgment0) and to the
multidimensional mental capacity (judgment1) within which the virtue of
practical wisdom resides (i.e., judgment2). Section III does not address the
problem of trying to determine if common sense or intuition (i.e., judgment3)
can ever be unsound in the absence of a pathologic condition.
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reasoning and ethical reasoning that could have gone astray.
Likewise, a sound judgment may still be biased. There are many
different forms of bias that cannot be easily identified, much less
controlled. Bias, it seems, is unlikely to ever be completely
extracted from (or missing in) the mental process of scientific
judgment. After all, we are human beings, not reasoning
machines.
We may conclude that both good judgment and sound
judgment are revealed in outcomes and reasoning processes that
are relatively unbiased and that are rarely in error (that is,
outcomes that are rarely made with frank errors in reasoning
and are acceptable to others in the long run). Both good and
sound judgment involves the open admission of values which
play a role in the ultimate outcome.
Who is qualified to make such an assessment; that is, who
can judge the outcomes, and the judgment of experts, judges,
and whoever else uses judgment in their professional practices?
The answer is not immediately apparent. Nevertheless, it seems
reasonable to think that some people’s judgment is better than
others.83
CONCLUSION
This brief excursion into the nature of judgment has
reaffirmed its necessity in causal thinking and has generated
more questions than answers. At the top of the list is the
problem of assessment: assessing the soundness of scientific
judgment as a mental capacity or process (judgment1) as well as
assessing the goodness of a judgment as outcome (judgment0).
The latter is well known in the biomedical sciences; it is the
problem of causation typically described in terms of the
quantity, types, and characteristics of evidence needed to make a
claim of disease causation. Perhaps it would be wise to add the
various dimensions of judgment as mental capacity or process,
for the two forms of judgment are intimately linked. The
problem of assessing the soundness of judgment—how we think
83
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about causation—also deserves much more attention from the
philosophers, psychologists, and cognitive scientists who study
such matters, and from those who, in their professional
practices, are called upon to employ judgment in our courts and
clinics, and in the area of public health.
The many dimensions and components of scientific judgment
give us some guidance on how it can be improved: by practicing
our reasoning skills, building professional character, and by
dutifully identifying the values that influence, even bias, our
decisions and actions. Avoiding bias is always a good idea and
always difficult to achieve. We must keep careful track not only
of our causal decisions but also of the processes that result in
those decisions.
In the end, we find ourselves close to where we began: at
the intersection of science, law, and policy, where so much
complexity arises, where so many decisions of vital importance
must be made, and where judgment matters most.

